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We incorporate information measures representing knowledge into an evolutionarymodel of coe-
volving ﬁrms and markets wherebythe growing orderliness of ﬁrms potentiates a predictable pro-
gression of market exchange innovations which themselves become beneﬁcial onlywith the growing
orderliness of ﬁrms. We do this bygeneralizing Nelson and Winter sty le evolutionarymodels which
are well suited to the studyof entry , exit, and growth dy namics at the level of individual ﬁrms or
entire industries. The required innovation is to use information measures to impose an order on
the routines constituting a ﬁrm, and bycorrelating order with ﬁrm proﬁtability , allow the prefer-
ential selection of innovations which increase order. In this viewpoint, the coherent mathematical
framework provided byinformation and probabilitytheorydescribes ﬁrm orderliness and variabil-
ity, as well as all selection operations. This informational approach allows modelling the synergistic
interactions between routines in a single ﬁrm and between diﬀerent ﬁrms in a general but compre-
hensive manner, so that we can successfullymodel and predict innovations speciﬁcallyfocussed on
organizational order. In particular, we can predict the coevolution over time of ﬁrm organizational
complexityand of increasinglysophisticated market exchange mechanisms for routines permitting
that increased organizational order. We demonstrate our approach using numerical simulations and
analytic techniques exploiting a multigame player environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation and the diﬀusion of innovations through an
industrial sector or an entire economy can be modelled
using evolutionary Nelson and Winter style approaches
[1]. These approaches employ stochastic random vari-
ables to generate variation in the microeconomic eﬃ-
ciencies of individual ﬁrms within some economic sector
subject to competitive selection to model entry, exit and
growth dynamics of individual ﬁrms or of entire indus-
trial sectors. As such, these models adequately reproduce
non-equilibrium growth dynamics [2–9]. Alternative ap-
proaches to evolutionary economics can examine optimal
strategy mixes generating information in uncertain en-
vironments [10], adopt a nonlinear dynamics approach
[11, 12], or population ecology approaches [13–16]. Var-
ious studies have sought to extend evolutionary models
beyond the simple examination of growth and diﬀusion
dynamics. Speciﬁc extensions include, for instance, mod-
elling ﬁrm learning of novel competencies [17], the subdi-
vision of the sequence of knowledge production into de-
ﬁned stages leading to formation of a market for knowl-
edge [18], and assessments of the impact of uncertainty on
ﬁrms [19]. In addition, innovation failures can be exam-
ined by, for instance, spatial lock-in and contingent path
dependence arising from chance and increasing returns
in economic geography [20, 21], and temporal lock-in as
in the example of the QWERTY keyboard [22].
A number of authors have discussed needed gener-
alizations to the Nelson and Winter approach, includ-
ing ongoing eﬀorts by the original exponents of these
models to, for instance, more fully incorporate institu-
tions [23]. Additionally, the need has been noted “for
a theory of endogenous change of available opportuni-
ties and of their selection ...[determined by] the envi-
ronment in which various forms of organisations coexist
and evolve ...[requiring a relating of] micro-dynamics
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to macro-dynamics, in order to analyse the interplay of
social and individual processes.” [24]. Required mod-
els then, likely required a merger of genetic algorithms
[25, 26], game theory and evolutionary game theory [27],
to allow modelling an economy as an evolving network
[28] implicitly incorporating learning [29]. In address-
ing similar goals, Potts noted the need for an evolving
multi-agent framework where agents were bundles of vari-
able sets of resources, control algorithms and schemata,
and interaction tags eﬀectively layering an evolving com-
munication network over an economy which conditioned
events and future evolution [30]. Similarly, Foster has
emphasized that “economic and social systems are knowl-
edge based and that the primary interactions within them
are exchanges of information.” [31]. In these latter two
references, the interactions between resources and rou-
tines creates an evolving network of synergistic interac-
tions across an economy, and consideration of this web
of interactions has led Mathews to generalize the original
routines of Nelson and Winter to become the resources
and the resource markets of the productive economy [32].
Here, resources—any entity necessary to the production
of goods and services—are produced and exchanged by
ﬁrms seeking to ensure distinctiveness and generate en-
trepreneurial proﬁts by maximizing the synergystic inter-
action between ﬁrm resources. In particular, “Resources
can be specialized and bundled together in highly dis-
tinctive conﬁgurations, to lend ﬁrms special competitive
advantages. Resources can be built by ﬁrms internally,
and they can be traded—as described every day in the
business pages of the newspaper.” [32].
This paper makes a ﬁrst eﬀort at modelling these evolv-
ing and interacting synergistic networks by adopting an
informational perspective. This allows representing the
synergistic interactions between routines by using infor-
mation measures to order ﬁrm routines and thereby cor-
relate ﬁrm survivability with ﬁrm order, or equivalently,
with a ﬁrm’s synergistic routine interactions. This is a
natural step to adopt as any model describing evolving
populations of ﬁrms subject to variability and proba-
bilistic selection processes, is most naturally done us-2
ing a probabilistic mathematical framework which nat-
urally subsumes information measures. In particular,
ﬁrms making economic decisions in uncertain environ-
ments are processing information to reduce variance or
uncertainty. Any economic activity which reduces vari-
ance is implementing a selection operation and thus is ef-
fectively implementing a Darwinian evolutionary process.
We follow [33] in emphasizing the role of selection in po-
tentiating the appearance of apparently self-organizing
ordered structures in economics, whether these opera-
tions have involved selecting cards from packs, select-
ing job applicants, computer systems, suppliers, and so
on. All such selection operations can be treated with full
generality as grist for the evolutionary mill. The math-
ematical description of a Darwinian evolutionary pro-
cess is entirely subsumed within information and prob-
ability theory. Then, uncertain economic environments
are properly described by probability distributions which
are collapsed into distributions with reduced uncertainty
through the processing of information. Firms which pro-
cess information generate internal and external order and
gain advantage by operating in a known environment
rather than in a merely probable one. Cost/beneﬁt ratios
of information processing investments can be precisely
quantiﬁed by comparing probable beneﬁts returned us-
ing distributions prior to, and after collapse with these
known ratios guiding innovation investment decisions.
Firm investments and innovations modify the internal
routines and organizational capacities of the ﬁrm and its
ability to order its external environment. The demand
for information and for the capacity to exploit that in-
formation creates an information market. More impor-
tantly, the evolution of information processing systems
must necessarily occur in a predictable sequence from
less complex to more complex allowing reliable predic-
tion of plausible innovation sequences. The ability to
predict such plausible sequences, while only general, nev-
ertheless exists, partly refuting claims that evolutionary
models must take a set of routines as a given and must
necessarily fail to model the origins of innovation [2], or
that a “predictive theory of novelty is simply a contra-
diction in terms”, due to the “inherently unpredictable
nature of imaginative, creative processes” [31].
Just as any Nelson and Winter style model based on
routines must include a market for the exchange of rou-
tines, then so must any evolutionary model of ordered
routines incorporate markets for the exchange of informa-
tion about ordered routines. The new feature is that or-
derliness is itself a growing quantity in the model, leading
to the expectation that markets will themselves evolve
over time. Hence, the expectation is that the orderliness
of ﬁrms and information market operations must coe-
volve over time. Our results about evolving market struc-
tures are necessarily general, and reﬂect similar observa-
tions of temporal sequencing in the evolving structures
of economic ecologies. For instance, coevolving systems
can create an ordered progression of economic ecologies—
in caricature, young ecosystems are dominated by “r-
strategists” exploiting a rapid turnover of large numbers
of oﬀspring organisms while older ecosystems are domi-
nated by “K-strategists” who carefully nurture a much
smaller number of oﬀspring organisms [34]. This ap-
proach, as also ours, outlines a framework to understand
coevolving endogenous institutions and requires not only
equations describing the selection of organisms, but also
linked equations describing institutional change, proba-
bly requiring numerical multi-agent models.
This paper demonstrates that in many cases, economic
markets are created and destroyed by evolutionary inno-
vation processes and that the operation of one market can
naturally be expected to lead to the generation of new
markets. In some cases, it is possible to make plausi-
ble predictions of evolutionary innovation sequences over
a broad range of diﬀering markets. The market evolu-
tion discussed here complements the market reproduc-
tion with variation mechanisms [35] subject to selection
pressures due to their relative success in achieving a par-
ticular end [36], as well as the market structuring mecha-
nisms permitting the coevolution of for instance, software
markets and software ﬁrms [37]. Here, software ﬁrms
provide initially free software versions to generate net-
work beneﬁts and externalities to create a market for a
commercial version of the software. More generally, Met-
calfe has noted “Nor are market institutions given. They
have to be established and their establishment, growth,
stabilisation and decline involve the investment of real
resources in market making activity.” [38], while also,
Potts has described the economy as a coordinated system
of distributed knowledge mediated by markets as knowl-
edge restructuring mechanisms, and where the growth of
knowledge leads to changes in the structure of the eco-
nomic system via a continual process of recombination of
interconnected rules into viable economic building blocks
which replicate and diﬀuse through the economic popu-
lation [39]. A similar emphasis on the importance of
connections appears in [40], and see also [41].
The coevolution of ﬁrms and markets can be mod-
eled using a modiﬁed game theory in which the creation
and destruction of resources over time create and de-
stroy games exploiting those resources for payoﬀs, with
the resulting time-dependent payoﬀs forcing participants
to shift from one game to the next to maximize bene-
ﬁt [42]. The resulting multigame environment models
the innovation of, for instance, mechanisms to create re-
source and payoﬀ distributions, to ﬁnd new strategies of
accessing new games, to move from one game to another,
and so on. This multigame environment relaxes most of
the constraints usually imposed in game theory. These
include the restriction to only a single game possessing
a ﬁxed number of players, each able to select strategies
from an immutable set of possible strategies under the
inﬂuence of a number of unchanging and known payoﬀ
functions [43]. The need to allow game players to extend
their strategy sets in evolutionary economics was noted in
Ref. [44]. To illustrate the diﬀerence between game the-
ory and multigame theory: game theory is constrained to
model incomplete information games by Bayesian anal-
ysis [45] for instance. In constrast, in multigame theory
the absence of information creates demand for informa-
tion which makes it proﬁtable to innovate to create sup-
ply and thus generates a novel market in that informa-
tion. This approach is more in accordance with observed
economic behaviour.
The resulting multigame modeling environment pro-
vides an analytic generalization of the “sugarscapes”
common in alife simulations [46–49], and of agent-based
computational economics [50, 51], which aim to exam-
ine the spontaneous appearance of large scale order in3
systems of autonomous agents. In these simulations, an
environment hosts agents exploiting a time-dependent re-
source distribution (sugar) which is consumed, concen-
trated and traded, perhaps with preferential selection of
trading partners [52].
II. PROBABILITY AND EVOLUTION IN
ECONOMICS
Firms are modeled as a single entity consisting of many
component parts ideally operating towards a single com-
mon goal through the application of various routines.
The total of all routines available to a ﬁrm fully char-
acterizes its available action choices and depend contin-
gently on the previous history of the ﬁrm, the capabili-
ties of its staﬀ, its cash-ﬂow situation, its organizational
structure, and so on. The innovation model developed
here will consider innovations of routines by single ﬁrms,
the imitation and diﬀusion of routines between ﬁrms and
the establishment of more and more complex markets for
the exchange of increasingly complex routines between
ﬁrms.
As is well known, it is diﬃcult to articulate the single
common goal being pursued by the components of a ﬁrm.
Firm proﬁtability is often adopted as the goal of a ﬁrm
and this is adequate as long as models focus only on inter-
actions between ﬁrms each considered as a single entity.
However, this paper seeks to consider the internal orga-
nization of ﬁrms (its routines) and then consider how in-
novation of routines might add or subtract to satisfaction
of ﬁrm goals. In many cases it is impossible to determine
how routines might add to proﬁtability and other mea-
sures to assess routines must be used. For example, it is
often impossible to directly correlate staﬀ outputs now to
subsequent ﬁrm proﬁtability. This leads many ﬁrms to
adopt routines which set staﬀ renumeration proportional
in part to ﬁrm proﬁtability so self-interested staﬀ will
act to maximize ﬁrm proﬁtability. Here, ﬁrm routines
are selected from among the many possible to maximally
correlate and organize the activities of ﬁrm components.
The best routines are those which maximize the ﬁtness
between the goals of ﬁrm components and the goals of the
ﬁrm itself. This paper adopts the “ﬁtness” of a ﬁrm and
of particular routines as an indicator of the contribution
made to ﬁrm goals. This word carries obvious links to
evolutionary biology and in both ﬁelds is poorly deﬁned.
It is not clear how the organization of a ﬁrm contributes
to ﬁrm goals though some ﬁtness measure is required for
models of innovation markets in ﬁrm organization levels.
Selection processes in uncertain environments form a
very large component of all the routines of a ﬁrm. Staﬀ
are selected from a range of applicants of largely unknown
quality, goods of unknown quality are selected from a
range of suppliers, individual staﬀ select the proportion
of their time spent on various projects without knowing
future project outcomes, and so on. More importantly,
ﬁrms themselves are subject to selection processes in the
various uncertain markets in which the ﬁrm operates.
A selection process is mathematically identical to the
use of information processing to reduce uncertainty in
probability distributions. Then, the usual way to model
selection in an uncertain environment is via probabil-
ity and information theory. Elementary introductions to
probability theory use examples such as “select two cards
without replacement from a pack”, or “select ﬁve mar-
bles with replacement from an urn” to introduce selection
processes. A selection process conditions an initial prob-
ability distribution (every one of 52 cards is equiprob-
able) to derive a new, selected probability distribution
whose reduced width reﬂects decreased uncertainty. In
such elementary probability examples, information is suc-
cessively applied to manipulate probability distributions
to derive desired results. A selection process is equivalent
to the processing of information to manipulate probabil-
ity distributions. Diﬀerent words are commonly used for
these simple mathematical operations including to select,
condition, partition or collapse a probability distribution.
The mathematical selection operation can be illus-
trated using a selection process which partitions a popu-
lation of ﬁrms with a ﬁtness probability distribution P(f)
into ﬁtness classes so that goods are purchased only from
highly organized (and ﬁt) and thus high quality ﬁrms, for
instance. (Here, the ﬁtness of a ﬁrm is crudely denoted
by a single parameter f.) This selection process, denoted
Ss, might act to eliminate from consideration all ﬁrms
which have a ﬁtness less than some value f0 to generate
















0i f f ≤ f0
N−1P(f)i f f0 <f
, (1)
where the notations “ ” and “⊕” mean logical “AND”
and “OR” respectively and “|” indicates the conditional
“given”. In this equation, the normalization factor N =
P(f>f 0) is the proportion of the surviving ﬁrm popu-
lation. (These results apply only if N  = 0.) The same
operation describes the selection of cards from a pack
according to some criteria.
The above mathematical selection process entirely sub-
sumes Darwinian evolutionary processes which require
variation and selection (and heritability). A probability
or resource distribution with non-zero variance provides
variation which is selected to optimize some beneﬁt. (The
remaining criteria of heritability is subsumed within the
continued functioning of the ﬁrm from one period to the
next.) Firms and economies routinely exploit informa-
tion to optimize selection operations and thus naturally
operate in an evolutionary manner. The demand for in-
formation makes it proﬁtable to innovate to provide sup-
ply establishing a market whenever derived beneﬁts sig-
niﬁcantly outweigh information processing costs. It is
well understood that information processing can confer
real beneﬁts.
For example, consider a typical situation where a ﬁrm
of ﬁtness f must purchase goods from one supplier se-
lected from a range of suppliers oﬀering goods of vary-
ing quality. The purchased goods might be of high or
low quality and these goods increment ﬁrm ﬁtness by an
amount ∆f denoting the diﬀerence between total derived
beneﬁts and total required costs. Final ﬁrm ﬁtness is
then f  = f +∆f. (This example is equivalent to a child
selecting a card from a pack of cards of diﬀering worth
to modify the value of their own hand.) From the ﬁrms’s4
point of view, the suppliers are described by a probabil-
ity distribution P(∆f) giving the probability that any
individual supplier provides a particular incremental ﬁt-
ness to the ﬁrm. Suppose that suppliers consist of a large
fraction ηb ≈ 1 which provide bad goods and which con-
tribute negative average incremental ﬁtness ∆ ¯ fb < 0t o
decrease ﬁrm ﬁtness f  <f. (The child selects one of the
numerous bad cards to decrease the value of their hand.)
Conversely, suppose a small proportion of the suppliers
ηg =1−ηb ≈ 0 oﬀer good quality so ∆ ¯ fg > 0a n dt h ea v -
erage ﬁrm ﬁtness is increased with f  >f. (The child se-
lects a rare good card to increase the value of their hand.)
The initial supplier (card) distribution breaks into a bad
supplier (bad card) distribution denoted b, and a good
supplier (good card) distribution denoted g,a s
P(∆f|g ⊕ b)=P(∆f   g)+P(∆f   b)
= P(g)P(∆f|g)+P(b)P(∆f|b)
= ηgPg(∆f)+ηbPb(∆f). (2)
with respective means for the good and bad distributions
of ∆ ¯ fg > 0 and ∆ ¯ fb < 0. If the ﬁrm does not employ
information processing to select a supplier, a random se-
lection of suppliers must be made giving an average ex-
pected return r = ηg∆ ¯ fg + ηb∆ ¯ fb ≈ ∆ ¯ fb   0, much less
than zero. Conversely, when the ﬁrm is able to acquire
and successfully process information about a supplier’s
quality and can target their purchases to good suppli-
ers, then the probability distribution that guides their
search collapses to P(∆f) → Pg(∆f) using the method-
ology of Eq. (1) with a much improved expected beneﬁt
r  =∆¯ fg   r ≈ ∆ ¯ fb. (If the child cheats to gain infor-
mation to detect desired cards before making a selection,
it is easier to select a good card.) Information processing
can confer a real beneﬁt in economies.
More importantly, well known techniques exist by
which organizational structure (information) can be ex-
ploited to allow the reliable prediction of plausible inno-
vation sequences. These methods do not specify which
particular innovations will appear but they do constrain
the space of possible innovations and are commonly used
to guide investment decisions.
For example, consider the probability of innovation Pi
of a composite mechanism M = m1 m2 consisting of two
components m1 and m2 via the usual probability decom-
position Pi(M)=Pi(m1)Pi(m2). This decomposition
allows the trite observation that component mechanisms
m1 and m2 must appear before the more complex M can
appear as if either of Pi(m1)=0o rPi(m2) = 0 then
necessarily Pi(M) = 0. Thus, for instance, computer-
network routers are a nonviable innovation before com-
puters appear and are widespread and linked by net-
works.
Consider next the probable operational success Ps of
an already existing composite mechanism M = m1  m2
with components m1 and m2. A high quality mecha-
nism has a high probability of successfully completing its
task so Ps ≈ 1 while a poor quality mechanism has low
probability of success giving Ps ≈ 0. The decomposition
Ps(M)=Ps(m1)Ps(m2) allows prediction of future se-
quences of innovations whenever there is an imbalance
between the probable success of mechanisms m1 and m2.
Suppose that mechanism m1 is poorly optimized while
m2 is highly optimized so Ps(m1) ≈ 0   Ps(m2) ≈ 1
giving Ps(M) ≈ Ps(m1). Then, any increase or decrease
in the operational eﬃciency of mechanism m2 will not af-
fect the success of the parent mechanism M so that mar-
kets are neutral to improvements in mechanism m2. This
allows the reliable prediction that market selection pres-
sures will act to improve mechanism m1 while decreasing
the quality (and cost) of m2 until Ps(m2) ≈ Ps(m1). The
resulting outcome of this process then allows the predic-
tion that if a composite mechanism is designed for obso-
lescence in some period, then few of its components will
have individual lifetimes much greater than this period.
III. SIMULATING INNOVATION MARKETS
In this section, a crude simulation illustrates later ana-
lytic methods to model ordered stages in the evolution of
ﬁrm routines, and in the formation of markets exchang-
ing routines between ﬁrms.
Consider a population of recent start-up ﬁrms in a new
economic sector so novel that little is known about which
routines optimize ﬁrm goals. (Consider internet start-
ups for instance.) In the absence of an ability to select
optimal routines, ﬁrms must start-up with whatever rou-
tines they can establish themselves. Suppose each ﬁrm
consist of exactly 20 routines numbered (g1,...,g 20)s e -
lected from the pool of all possible routines labeled by
integers from [1,100] inclusive. Suppose further that odd
numbered routines are easy to ﬁnd and implement, while
even numbered routines are hard to ﬁnd and implement.
Then, at time t = 0, ﬁrms are created by random selec-
tions from the pool of all 100 possible routines though
even numbered routines are 2−5 =1 /32 times less likely
to be selected than odd numbered routines. Otherwise,
selection probabilities are uniform.
To allow examination of ﬁrm organizational structure,
an arbitrary deﬁnition of ﬁtness is imposed on the ﬁrm







0i f gi+1 = gi
1
gi+1−gi if gi+1  = gi
. (3)
Then, each routine makes a ﬁtness contribution depen-
dent on its nearest neighbours. When nearest neighbour
separation gi+1−gi is zero no contribution is made, when
it is unity a maximum contribution of +1 is made, and
as the separation increases a decreasing contribution oc-
curs. Fitness contributions are negative when gi+1−gi is
negative. This deﬁnition of ﬁtness allows ﬁrms to possess
a maximum ﬁtness of +20 when all routines are consec-
utive and incrementing, and a minimum of −20 when all
routines are consecutive and decrementing. The scarcity
of even numbers in the routine pool means that ﬁrms
are initially overwhelmingly constructed using only odd
numbered routines. The possible ﬁtness range of a ﬁrm
constructed using only odd numbered routines is between
−10 and +10 as nearest neighbours are separated by at
least two units.
A typical randomly chosen initial ﬁrm is
(95,75,99,15,85,25,89,97,7,47,
37,5,93,17,55,73,95,29,23,59) (4)
which has ﬁtness −0.0279. Note the absence of even num-
bered routines.5
It is to be noted that the initial random distribution of
routines in ﬁrms, the absence of order of those routines,
and the resulting minimal ﬁtness of all ﬁrms mitigate
against ﬁrms seeking to imitate or otherwise exchange
routines with each other. If all ﬁrms are roughly equally
unﬁt and it is not yet known which routines contribute to
ﬁtness, then there can be no incentive for imitating rou-
tines or purchasing routines or head-hunting staﬀ from
other ﬁrms to copy routines. This model predicts that
there will be no market in ﬁrm routines in novel economic
sectors.
In the absence of an exchange market, a ﬁrm can only
increase its ﬁtness by internal innovation of routines.
This is simulated by allowing each ﬁrm to operate over
600 generations where each generation sees the sequen-
tial potential innovation of each and every routine in the
ﬁrm. (This creates a highly accelerated simulation for
display purposes.) For each routine in the ﬁrm, innovate
a potential new routine from the innovation pool, eval-
uate the ﬁtness of the ﬁrm both with and without the
innovation, and discard the lower ﬁtness routine.
A neutral innovation mechanism is applied in cases
where the mutated and original ﬁrm have the same ﬁt-
ness. This can arise when routines have the structure
(...,x,a,x,...) where the total ﬁtness is independent of
routine a. (It cancels out of the total ﬁtness expression.)
Whenever innovations are entirely neutral, an allowance













FIG. 1: The evolution of ﬁtness of a single typical ﬁrm subject
to (a) random innovation with a scarcityof even numbered
routines for generations from 0 — 600, (b) exchange of rou-
tines with other ﬁrms giving access to manyeven numbered
routines from generation 200 — 600, and (c) three-routine
packet exchange with other ﬁrms from generation 400 — 600.
The evolution of a single ﬁrm is followed in each case with
new market strategies being introduced at generations 200
and 400 respectively.
A typical simulation over 600 generations starting from
the initial ﬁrm of Eq. (4) is shown as curve (a) of Fig.
1. This curve shows an initial rapid increase in ﬁtness as
the ﬁrm innovates new routines conferring higher ﬁtness.
The scarcity of even numbers in the pool of possible rou-
tines means that it is diﬃcult for ﬁrms to innovate to ﬁt-
ness levels higher than +10. Towards the end of the simu-
lation, the number of even numbered routines in the ﬁrm
is slowly increasing allowing some increase in ﬁtness. The
probability of any given innovation is constant in time,
though the increase in ﬁrm organization means that the
probability of a good innovation decreases in proportion
to the increase in ﬁrm organization. This generates long
periods of stasis in the simulation for long times. After
600 generations, the ﬁrm has innovated to
(27,29,31,33,95,96,9,10,11,13,
14,15,87,91,92,93,11,12,13,15) (5)
with ﬁtness 11.7563. Note that innovations have ﬁxed 5
even numbered routines into the ﬁrm.
At around generation 200, about one quarter of the
routines in ﬁrms are even numbered, and this greatly
exceeds the number of evens available from the routine
pool (with proportion about 3%). The evolution of ﬁrms
creates a new resource of even numbered routines within
the environment. If ﬁrms could access the routines of
other ﬁrms through imitation, purchase, theft or what-
ever, they gain access to a far higher proportion of even
numbered routines than are readily available from inno-
vations. The formal details of this evolutionary step are
discussed in subsequent sections. The present simulation
merely illustrates the eﬀects of this step.




with ﬁtness 9.1101 and containing 3 even numbers. At
this stage, the potential beneﬁt from exchanging routines
with other ﬁrms to access even numbers creates a demand
for the innovation of single routine exchange mechanisms.
(For display purposes, this new innovation is introduced
at a ﬁxed generation 200 and this new routine is not
identiﬁed by any particular number.)
The eﬀect of single routine exchange between ﬁrms
possessing many even numbers is shown in the ﬁtness
curve (b) of Fig. 1. Starting at generation 200, a
very steep increase in ﬁtness is manifest as ﬁrms become
evenly populated by even and odd numbers. The steep
growth gradually tails oﬀ into a long period of stasis as
ﬁrm organization becomes locked into ineﬃcient arrange-




with ﬁtness 12.9535, while by generation 600 it becomes
(27,28,29,8,9,84,9,10,11,13,
14,15,16,17,92,93,11,12,13,14) (8)
with ﬁtness 13.4535. Here, the ﬁtness combination
(...,8,9,47,9,10,...) is locked to change by single rou-
tine innovation or exchange as all possible changes are
deleterious. Only neutral drift can change this sequence
though this has no eﬀect on ﬁtness values. Stasis then
exists under single routine innovations and under single
routine exchange processes.
By generation 400, average ﬁrm organization levels
have increased and ﬁrms now contain large islands of
consecutively numbered routines conferring high ﬁtness.6
This novel feature of the environment did not exist be-
fore about generation 400, and thus, no market could
possibly exist for multiple routine exchange. As before,
the novel appearance of these ordered islands creates a
potential beneﬁt to any ﬁrm innovating routines allowing
the exchange of ordered routine packets with other ﬁrms.
When the exchange of single routines confers no beneﬁts,
the exchange of ordered packets of routines does provide
potential ﬁtness beneﬁts.
For display purposes, a new strategy allowing the or-
dered exchange of packets of three routines between dif-
ferent ﬁrms is enacted after generation 400. The initial
ﬁrm chosen is the generation 400 ﬁrm of Eq. (7) with ﬁt-
ness evolution shown as curve (c) of Fig. 1. As usual, the
innovation of a new strategy accessing a novel resource
leads to a rapid increase in ﬁtness with an eventual tail
oﬀ into stasis as increasing order makes the exchange of




with ﬁtness 18.125. Note the persistence of the boundary
(...,16,17,25,26,...) between consecutive ordered do-
mains. This boundary is relatively impervious to three-
routine packet exchanges.
All of the above exchange processes have been with
randomly selected exchange partners. However, as dis-
cussed in Eq. (2) beneﬁts exist for ﬁrms using infor-
mation to target exchange practices. Suppose that in-
stead of exchange with random partners, ﬁrms had inno-
vated mechanisms to target their exchanges to only those
ﬁrms oﬀering high ﬁtness exchanges. Thus, if a ﬁrm con-
sisted of routines numbered in the 20s, exchanges are
rejected with ﬁrms whose routines are numbered in the
80s. The eﬀects of information-based targeted exchanges
are shown in Fig. 2 oﬀering a comparison of the rates of
ﬁtness growth for ﬁrms making exchanges with randomly
selected other ﬁrms [Curves (b) and (c) copied from Fig.
1] and ﬁrms using information to target their exchange
partners to maximize beneﬁt [curves (b ) and (c )]. Curve
(b ) shows the eﬀect of targeted single routine exchange
introduced at generation 200 using the initial ﬁrm of Eq.
(6). By generation 600, the ﬁrm becomes
(29,30,31,8,9,4,9,10,11,13,
14,15,89,90,91,10,11,12,13,14) (10)
with ﬁtness 13.458. Note the initially higher rates of
ﬁtness growth and higher resulting ﬁtness due to tar-
geted exchange policies, and the continued existence of
the (...,9,4,9,...) trap impervious to even targeted sin-
gle routine exchange. Curve (c ) shows the eﬀect of tar-
geted 3-routine packet exchange implemented at genera-
tion 400 using the initial ﬁrm of Eq. (7). By generation
600 the ﬁrm is
(38,39,40,41,42,43,10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17,9,10,11,12,13,14) (11)
with ﬁtness 16.845. Here, targeted packet exchange had a
slightly higher initial rate of ﬁtness growth which resulted
in three ordered domains of routines and lower overall
ﬁtness compared to untargeted packet exchange which
had resulted in two ordered domains of routines. This
displays the common observation that an overly rapid
local optimization can lead to poor global optimization
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making exchanges with randomlyselected other ﬁrms and
ﬁrms using information to target their exchange partners to
maximize beneﬁt. Curves (b)a n d( c) are from Fig. 1 and
show random selections. Curves (b
 )a n d( c
 ) show the eﬀects
of targeted exchange of single routines and packets of rou-
tines respectively. Targeted exchanges increase initial rates
of ﬁtness growth but this overlyrapid local optimization can
lead to poor global optimization with the ﬁtness of curve (c
 )
substantiallybelow that of curve ( c) bygeneration 600.
The important point about this simulation is that sin-
gle routine exchanges cannot arise as long as the routine
distribution in ﬁrms is identical to the routine distribu-
tion available from innovations. If these distributions are
identical then there is no beneﬁt and many costs involved
in innovating mechanisms to exchange routines, and such
mechanisms would not arise. It is only when ﬁrms evolve
to contain a desired resource that is not readily available
from innovations, that the beneﬁts of exchange of rou-
tines begins to outweigh costs. (Conversely, in economic
sectors in which innovation costs outweigh imitation and
exchange costs, imitation markets will rapidly appear
and must be constrained if these impact adversely on
innovation investment decisions.) The evolution of rou-
tine probability distributions governs the beneﬁt payoﬀs
of new strategies and thus governs their evolution. Sim-
ilarly, routine packet exchange processes cannot evolve
until ﬁrms have evolved islands of order. There are no
beneﬁts and many costs associated with the exchange of
disordered routine packets. This leads to the expectation
that packet exchange processes can only arise after the
creation of signiﬁcant order via single routine exchange
processes. Thus, packet exchange processes must follow
single routine exchange processes which in turn, must fol-
low lengthy periods of random innovations with selection.
Market evolution must proceed in ordered sequences and
economic models must be able to predict such sequences.
The above simulation can be endlessly generalized. For
instance, innovations might develop entirely new routines
with fractional number values (20.3 say) whose incor-
poration greatly increases ﬁtness. Alternatively, ﬁrms7
might innovate the organizational capacity to handle
larger units allowing mergers giving access to maximum
ﬁtness levels of +40 say. A diﬀerent innovation in organi-
zational capacity might modify the ﬁtness formula of Eq.
(3) to 1/(g1 − gN) which depends only on the ﬁrst and
last routines of the ﬁrm. All other routines are rendered
redundant leading to ﬁrm size reductions.
The next sections seek to develop the capability to
reproduce this simulation analytically. An analytic ap-
proach can increase understanding and comprehension
in ways that particular and contingent simulations can-
not. An analytic treatment of the above crude simula-
tion might be applied to any number of evolving infor-
mation processing systems including the growth of order
in stamp collections or in stock market portfolios, or as
here, in exchange markets.
IV. MULTIGAME THEORY
This section develops a pseudo analytic approach to
multigame theory and for convenience groups together
a number of equations, very brieﬂy and almost in table
format, which are properly introduced and repetitively
used later in this paper.
Game theory follows the dynamics of a time dependent
environment containing players or ﬁrms able to enact dif-
ferent strategies or routines with varying probabilities.
The environment
E(t) ≡{ Gi(f,t),P m(∆f|i)} (12)
consists of all ﬁrm records Gi for ﬁrm i with ﬁtness f
together with a resource pool Pm(∆f|i) which is condi-
tioned by ﬁrm index i and speciﬁes the probability of an
incremental change in ﬁtness f(t+1)=f(t)+∆f for any
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which speciﬁes each ﬁrm’s necessarily probabilistic ﬁt-
ness distribution Pi(f) (as strategy choice is probabilis-
tic). The use of this distribution avoids the need to track
the details of every routine in every ﬁrm and makes an
analytic evolutionary treatment possible. Firm records
also list available strategy sets S and the probabilities p
with which strategies are chosen. Game theory generally
considers only a single game so ﬁrms must participate
with unit probability  a = 1 in a single game denoted a,
and can participate in all other games j  = a with prob-
ability  j = 0. At time t, ﬁrms implement probabilistic
strategies








causing ineﬃcient ﬁrms to be deleted from the game.
Here, k time steps each consist of implementing chosen
strategies to maximize their ﬁtness probability distribu-
tions followed by selection operations. Operations Sr and
Ss do not commute. The above dynamical regime is suf-
ﬁcient to model the dynamics of a single game and is
expected to generate changes in the environment due to
ﬁrm activities.
The dynamical evolution of the environment can gener-
ate novel resource pools which can be accessed by inno-
vating novel strategies to deﬁne new games in the en-
vironment. The innovation of new games is modeled
by providing mechanisms to allow ﬁrms to access new
games with probability  j > 0 for some j. At every time
step k, the probability that any given ﬁrm innovates a
new strategy to access a new resource pool is, provided
 j(t + k)=0 ,
P[ j(t + k +1 )> 0| j(t + k)=0 ] = η1(∆F)
P[ j(t + k +1 )=0 | j(t + k)=0 ] = η0(∆F) (16)
where probabilities are determined in terms of functions
η1(∆F)a n dη0(∆F)=1− η1(∆F). As the probability
of innovating a new strategy is low, typically η1(∆F)i s
close to zero and η0(∆F)i sc l o s et oo n e .
These probabilities are dependent on parameter ∆F
which measures the relative beneﬁts and costs of access-
ing novel resource pools created in the dynamically evolv-
ing environment. Reasonable though heuristic results
can be obtained by taking ∆F ∝ B/C to be propor-
tional to the beneﬁts B to be derived from accessing a
new resource pool and taking the costs of innovation C
to increase exponentially with beneﬁt, so C ∝ exp[∆F].
Consequently, the evolution probabilities of Eq. (16) to
be proportional to the beneﬁt / cost ratio gives
η1(∆F)=¯ η1∆Fe −∆F
η0(∆F)=1 − η1(∆F). (17)
Setting ¯ η1 ≈ 0 gives the required probabilities with η0
being close to one and η1 being close to zero. These
probabilities determine the approximate number of time








When beneﬁts are zero (∆F = 0) or when costs are high
(e−∆F = 0), then the probability of evolving a new strat-
egy P[ j(t + k +1 )> 0| j(t + k)=0 ]→ 0 and an in-
ﬁnite number of time steps are required. When beneﬁts
and costs are in balance (∆F exp[−∆F] ≈ O(1) when
∆F = 1) then the average number of time steps required
to innovate a new strategy is N ≈ 1/¯ η1 in this model.
The ability to generate novel strategy sets and new
games in response to environmental dynamics creates a
multigame environment. Evolution of this environment
causes the appearance and disappearance of novel re-
sources which are accessed by newly innovated strategies
in novel games. Game theory normally considers situ-
ations where players have no choice about which game
they might use to optimize their payoﬀs, though in eco-
nomics, such choices play a typically large part of any
individual’s eﬀorts to maximizing proﬁts.8
V. INNOVATION MARKETS
This section models evolving economic systems in
which ﬁrm innovation over time creates novel supply and
novel demand to establish novel markets. In turn, the ap-
pearance of these new markets modiﬁes the further evo-
lution of ﬁrms to generate yet more new markets. These
sequences of changes can occur in predictable evolution-
ary sequences in some circumstances.
Suppose that some recently produced technology has
established a new economic sector and that a large num-
ber of new ﬁrms have rushed to enter this market. (Con-
sider for instance, the eﬀect of the internet.) We ignore
the possible entry of large existing ﬁrms and treat all
new entrants as small. The recent entry of ﬁrms into
this novel economic sector means that ﬁrms are poorly
organized and their routines are not optimal though ﬁrms
are unsure about how exactly to optimize their routines.
Further, the absence of long-time established ﬁrms means
that ﬁrms cannot optimize routines by the common prac-
tice of imitating market leaders. In this situation, all
ﬁrms are organized sub-optimally with diﬀerent ﬁrms
typically employing highly divergent strategies accom-
panied by considerable debate about which routines and
strategies are optimal. The divergence of strategies em-
ployed by diﬀerent ﬁrms means that there are few bene-
ﬁts to be derived from exchange between ﬁrms (including
imitation). Thus, mechanisms allowing the exchange of
routines between ﬁrms are presumed not to exist initially
and the evolution of such mechanisms is a desired out-
come of the model.
Consider an environment E(t) containing ﬁrms i each
with ﬁtness denoted f reproducing identically from year
to year using strategy SI implemented with probability
pI. Firms which cannot improve their operations by imi-
tation or by exchange must seek to optimize activities via
internally sourced innovation. Innovations are assumed
to occur in an essentially random manner with this strat-
egy Sm implemented with probability pm. The absence
of other strategies implies pI + pm =1 .
Innovations are implemented in the hope that they
improve ﬁrm outcomes but this is uncertain and inno-
vations can increment or decrement ﬁrm ﬁtness by an
amount ∆f with probability Pm(∆f|i) conditioned on
ﬁrm index i. Implementing a single bad innovation can
destroy a ﬁrm and, as might be expected, there are far
more bad innovations than good so the distribution is
weighted to negative values and has mean ∆ ¯ fm   0.
In these circumstances ﬁrms take steps to prevent inno-
vation and maintain stasis by setting innovation proba-
bilities to zero, pm = 0. Alternatively, ﬁrms can enact
a strategy of using internal vetting processes to select
hopefully good innovations. Using the techniques of Eqs.
(1) and (2), this results in an innovation beneﬁt probabil-
ity distribution centered around zero with positive and
negative innovations roughly equally weighted. In this
case the distribution mean is approximately ∆ ¯ fm ≈ 0.
In turn, the reasonable probability of obtaining a pos-
itive beneﬁt allows ﬁrms to set innovation probabilities
greater than zero, pm > 0. As is well known, innovation
vetting processes are important to preserve ﬁrm viability.
In this paper, all ﬁrms use internal selection processes to
maximize innovation beneﬁts though we subsume these
processes within the strategy Sm. (Explicit models of
these vetting processes could be constructed.)
Innovation beneﬁts must be conditioned on ﬁrm index
i as a good innovation for one ﬁrm is a bad innovation
for another ﬁrm with diﬀerent established routines . Fur-
ther, as company organization ﬁtness levels increase and
companies become more highly organized, beneﬁcial in-
novations become more and more hard to come by. This
was observed in the previous simulation of Fig. 1. Thus,





rises, the distribution Pm(∆f|i) migrates to the left
Pm(∆f|i)=Pm(∆f + ¯ fi) (20)




Pm(∆f|i) d(∆f) → 0. (21)
This models the inability to ﬁnd ever increasingly beneﬁ-
cial innovations so that ﬁrms relying solely on innovation
eventually cease to increase ﬁtness. This mechanism gen-
erates stasis. (See Fig. 3.)
For simplicity, the innovation beneﬁt distribution is
considered to be time independent and conditioning
events which can create macroscopic changes in the in-
novation incremental ﬁtness distribution Pm are ignored.
For example, a very bad innovation implemented at one
time makes almost any other innovation at subsequent
times highly beneﬁcial. (If the ﬁrm adopts some pro-
cedure leading to bankruptcy, any change at all to that
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FIG. 3: Pm(∆f|i) speciﬁes the probable incremental return
∆f from innovation conditioned on ﬁrm index i.F i r m i2
has higher ﬁtness than ﬁrm i1 so Pm(∆f|i2) has decreased
probabilityof beneﬁcial innovations compared to Pm(∆f|i1).
Pi(f,0) denotes the initial probable return distribution for
ﬁrms i with ﬁtness denoted f, while Pi(f,t) is the evolving
ﬁrm ﬁtness distribution. (Vertical scales are arbitrary.)
At time t =0 ,ﬁ r mi possesses a probable ﬁtness dis-
tribution Pi(f,0) weighted to low ﬁtness values as, by as-
sumption, ﬁrms are recent entrants to a new sector and
are ignorant of how to best optimize routines. (See Fig.
3.) The low ﬁtness values of all ﬁrms precludes exchange
markets.9
Fitness is improved by judicious selection of strategy
mix Sr =  a(pISI +pmSm) to maximally increase ﬁtness
in a selective environment. Natural selection Ss operates
on all ﬁrms simultaneously to partition the entire popu-
lation into high and low ﬁtness classes with elimination
of the low ﬁtness class. Firms which can’t compete are






0 i ∈ low ﬁtness class,
Pi(f,t) i ∈ high ﬁtness class.
(22)
The evolution of each ﬁrm is then enacted using Eq.
(15). Repeated application of chosen ﬁrm strategies gen-
erates variation which is combined with selection to im-
plement a Darwinian selection process. The expected
outcome is a population of highly ﬁt ﬁrms possessing
widely divergent organizational structures employing a
large range of diﬀering routines as the occasional good
innovation is incorporated into diﬀerent ﬁrms. This pro-
cess will tend to increase ﬁtness returns, initially quite
rapidly and then more slowly as more and more high ﬁt-
ness innovations are incorporated into ﬁrms. The ﬁtness
increase is expected to asymptote to some maximum as
it takes longer and longer to ﬁnd better innovations as
modeled by Eq. (21). The generated dynamics is ex-
pected to be similar to be that shown in the simulation
of Fig. 1.
The need to maximize ﬁtness growth rates in a com-
petitive environment allows predictions about strategy
selection probabilities. Successful ﬁrms initially optimize
their rates of ﬁtness growth by setting pm ≈ 1 as initial
ﬁtness levels are very low, and innovations are relatively
beneﬁcial. As ﬁtness increases beneﬁcial innovations be-
come increasingly hard to ﬁnd and ﬁrms are expected to
minimize innovations pm ≈ 0 and associated expences.
A novel feature of this approach is that the optimum
strategy mix changes over time in predictable ways as
population ﬁtness levels change.
A. Exchange of single routines
The evolving environment E(t) now surrounds any in-
dividual ﬁrm with many other ﬁrms oﬀering examples
of other organizational styles and newly innovated rou-
tines. The ongoing survival of these neighbouring ﬁrms
means that their organization and previously adopted in-
novations oﬀer high ﬁtness and this leads to the evolu-
tion of acquisition and exchange mechanisms. A high
ﬁtness routine is just as likely to be found in any ﬁrm
so exchange mechanisms will probably be untargeted. A
ﬁrm can acquire innovations from other ﬁrms by either
imitation, acquisition of staﬀ, purchase of ﬁrm compo-
nents, or by other exchange mechanisms. The equivalent
point in the previous simulation occurs when evolution
by random innovation gives the ﬁrm population the even
numbers which are scarce in the innovation pool creating
rewards for the evolution of exchange mechanisms.
If a ﬁrm obtains innovations from its neighbouring
ﬁrms, it gains access to innovations which have been
subject to many periods of selection and which carry
high ﬁtness. Denote the probable incremental ﬁtness re-
turns to ﬁrm i when an exchange occurs with ﬁrm j as
Pe(i,j,∆f|i) which, as usual, is conditioned on ﬁrm in-
dex i. Then, increasing ﬁtness of ﬁrm i decreases the
probability of a beneﬁcial exchange taking place. (See
Fig. 4.) This distribution oﬀers high average ﬁtness re-
turns with mean ∆ ¯ fe much greater than those available
from the innovation pool, ∆ ¯ fm ≈ 0. With the appear-
ance of this new resource pool, the environment evolves
to be
E(t) ≡{ Gi(f,t),P m(∆f|i),P e(i,j,∆f|i)}. (23)
This evolved environment oﬀers two diﬀerent games for
ﬁrms even though no ﬁrms have yet innovated novel ex-
change strategies. This expanded array of strategies is
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recognizing that ﬁrms can enact two strategies accessing
strategy mix {pI,p m,S I,S m} with probability  a =1
(certainty), and an as-yet-unevolved exchange strategy
{pe,S e} accessed with probability  e = 0 (not innovated
yet). Each ﬁrm’s chosen strategy is then
Sr =  a(pISI + pmSm)+ epeSe, (25)
where  a +  e =1 ,pI + pm =1a n dpe = 1. Natural
selection continues to operate as in Eq. (22) making ﬁrm
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FIG. 4: Pm(∆f|i) gives the incremental ﬁtness probability
distribution for random innovations for ﬁrm i, Pe(i,j,∆f|i)
determines the probable incremental ﬁtness distribution from
exchange between ﬁrm i and j where the average ﬁtness of
ﬁrm i2 is much greater than that for ﬁrm i1,a n dPi(f,t)
is the ﬁtness distribution of ﬁrm i with ﬁtness denoted f.
(Vertical scales are arbitrary.)
Firms accessing only the innovation pool derive an av-
erage ﬁtness increase of pm∆ ¯ fm ≈ 0. In contrast, any
ﬁrm able to access routines from other ﬁrms by evolv-
ing a new strategy Se can obtain an average beneﬁt
∆ ¯ fe   0. This creates a potential return diﬀerence
∆F =∆¯ fe − ∆ ¯ fm   0, and while not yet realized, this
potential diﬀerence tilts internal ﬁrm selection processes
towards the innovation of mechanisms realizing and ex-
ploiting this potential return diﬀerence. The probability10
that strategies are innovated to access beneﬁts ∆F from
the novel resource is given by Eq. (16).
Prior to the evolution of high ﬁtness ﬁrms in the envi-
ronment, the beneﬁt derived from the exchange of rou-
tines is ∆F = 0 ensuring that exchange processes can
not evolve. However, after the appearance of high ﬁtness
ﬁrms in the environment the potential beneﬁt becomes
∆F>0 so every ﬁrm throws a dice at each time step to
determine if it has innovated a novel exchange mechanism
giving access to the routines of other ﬁrms. The average
number of time steps required is given in Eq. (18). It
is to be noted that strategies to provide the exchange of
single routines might evolve as they confer greater bene-
ﬁts than random innovations. However, the exchange of
a packet of many interlinked routines cannot yet evolve
as ﬁrms lack suﬃcient order to make this worthwhile and
∆F = 0 for packet exchange.
This approach is able to predict that exchange pro-
cesses will only evolve after routines available from neigh-
bouring ﬁrms become signiﬁcantly better than those
available from internal innovation. However, this model
is not able to predict the speciﬁc exchange mechanism
used. Basically, a supply and demand situation is created
which deﬁnes a market, but the speciﬁc mechanisms used
to operate this market are not speciﬁed in this approach.
Once the innovation of new strategies has occurred,
routine exchanging ﬁrms re-apportion their participation
between all existing games. For a given ﬁrm, if pro-
portion  a is devoted to stasis and internal innovation,
and proportion  e is spent on exchange processes, then
the expected average incremental return is approximately
 m∆ ¯ fm +  e∆ ¯ fe when pm =1a n dpe =1 . A st h i sa v -
erage return is maximized by setting  e ≈ 1 there will
be strong selection pressures for ﬁrms to minimize in-
ternal innovations and to obtain new routines only from
the pre-selected routines of proven high ﬁtness in other
ﬁrms. The ﬁrm population then rapidly bifurcates into
a class of ﬁrms described by ( a,  e) ≈ (0,1) with high
ﬁtness rising from exchange mechanisms, and a class
of non-exchanging ﬁrms with low ﬁtness described by
( a,  e) ≈ (1,0). If the component populations remain
in the same market, the less-ﬁt non-exchanging popula-
tion will be rapidly eliminated.
This model then predicts that a new economic sector
will initially be distinguished by innovation and will later
be dominated by imitation and other ﬁrm exchange pro-
cesses.
B. The exchange of packets of routines
It is expected that the exchange of single routines one
at a time eventually become deleterious as consistently
high ﬁtness ﬁrms are highly ordered. Introducing a par-
ticular routine into a ﬁrm might only be beneﬁcial if a
number of other routines are present, and deliterious oth-
erwise. Then, the exchange of randomly selected single
routines even if sourced from high ﬁtness ﬁrms will even-
tually destroy suﬃcient order to negate the beneﬁts of
new routine acquisition. At this stage, ﬁrm ﬁtness levels
stagnate and stasis is approached. If the exchange of sin-
gle routines becomes deleterious because of ordered inter-
connections between the routines, then the exchange of
ordered packets of interconnected routines becomes ben-
eﬁcial. The equivalent point in the simulation of Fig. 1
occurs when single routine exchange leads to ﬁrms pop-
ulated by islands of order but trapped against further
ﬁtness increases. The growth of the islands of order po-
tentiates the exchange of ordered routine packets. This
cannot occur until single routine exchange processes have
created such ordered islands.
In practical terms, the ﬁrms in the maturing economic
sector now have suﬃcient information to know which
routines are compatible and which conﬂict with each
other. This information is itself a tradable commodity
and might be marketed by a senior manager seeking a
new position.
Potential beneﬁts then exist for any ﬁrm innovating
a strategy Sp allowing the exchange of ordered packets
of routines which tilts selection pressures towards the
innovation of this strategy. The methodology straight-
forwardly follows that above. On the appearance of
such strategies, the population bifurcates into a class
( a,  e,  p) ≈ (1,0,0) relying on no exchange processes,
a class relying on single routine exchanges ( a,  e,  p) ≈
(0,1,0) and a new highly organized class relying on or-
dered routine packet exchange ( a,  e,  p) ≈ (0,0,1).
C. Information processing innovation systems
As seen in the simulation of Fig. 1, the exchange of
routine packets allows a rapid increase in ﬁrm ﬁtness.
However, a simulated company exploiting routines in the
range {10 — 30} derives little beneﬁt from exchanges
with a ﬁrm exploiting routines in the range {70 — 90}.
Exchanges between such ﬁrms are deleterious and be-
come increasingly deleterious over time as companies be-
come more highly organized. This suggests that there are
beneﬁts to evolving mechanisms to distinguish classes of
companies so ﬁrms can optimize their packet exchange
processes.
While poorly understood, it is well accepted that ﬁrms
are highly ordered both temporally and spatially, and
over both short and long ranges. Shuﬄing routines via
exchange will by chance create some well ordered ﬁrms
with high ﬁtness which serve as sources of imitation for
other ﬁrms. At this stage routine packet exchange mecha-
nisms with randomly selected ﬁrms becomes increasingly
deleterious compared to targeted exchanges. If exchanges
are targeted to that class of ﬁrms oﬀering high ﬁtness
packets, ﬁtness growth rates can be maximized.
At this stage, ﬁrms can be naturally partitioned into
classes with exchange of routines within a particular
class being beneﬁcial, while the exchange of routines out-
side that class is deleterious. The incremental exchange
beneﬁt probability distribution is then conditioned by
ﬁrm index and class membership Pe(i,j,∆f,n,m) de-
scribing exchanges between ﬁrm i ∈ nth class and ﬁrm
j ∈ mth class. (Conditioning is ignored here.) When n =
m, exchange beneﬁts are high with Pe(i,j,∆f,n,n)=
Pe,nn(∆f)h a v i n gm e a n∆¯ fnn   0. Conversely, if ﬁrms
occupy diﬀerent classes so n  = m then exchange beneﬁts
are low with Pe(i,j,∆f,n,m)=Pe,nm(∆f) having mean
∆ ¯ fnm   0. At this stage, the environment evolves to
E(t) ≡{ Gi,P m,P e(i,j,∆f,n,m),I(i)}, (26)
where I(i) denotes a possible information distribution11
within the environment carrying class marker informa-
tion. For environments where the information distri-
bution does not exist to be exploited, necessarily the
beneﬁts of information processing are identically zero,
∆F = 0, so the innovation of information processing
mechanisms has zero probability. Each routine exchang-
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where  c = 0 deﬁnes a new potential game where ﬁrms
target only their own class using strategy Sc to access
the information distribution I(i) with probability pc.[ A l l
exchange processes are subsumed within game ( e,p e,S e)
here.]
Provided the information exists within the environ-
ment, ﬁrms acquiring and processing information about
class membership can realize substantial beneﬁts. Fol-
lowing the approach of Eq. (2), for ﬁrm i ∈ nth class
the potential exchange population can be partitioned into
low and high return classes
Pe(i,j,∆f,n,m)=ηnnPe,nn(∆f)+ηnmPe,nm(∆f)
(28)
where ηnn and ηnm are the population proportions of
high and low ﬁtness classes respectively. It is usually the
case that ηnm ≈ 1a n dηnn =1− ηnm ≈ 0 giving an av-
erage incremental beneﬁt obtained from exchanging with
a randomly selected ﬁrm of ∆ ¯ fr ≈ ∆ ¯ fnm   0. Con-
versely, any ﬁrm exploiting environmental information
to target exchanges to their own class forces a collapse
Pe(i,j,∆f,n,m) → Pe,nn(∆f) using the methodology of
Eq. (1). This collapse provides an average incremental
beneﬁt of ∆ ¯ fnn much greater than that obtained from
random selections ∆ ¯ fnm.
As previously discussed, a potential incremental ﬁtness
diﬀerence ∆F =∆¯ fnn − ∆ ¯ fnm   0 exists which creates
selection pressures for the innovation of mechanisms Sc
able to recognize and exploit only high ﬁtness classes.
Once such mechanisms appear, it is expected that ﬁrms
maximize their rate of ﬁtness increase by setting  c ≈ 1
leading to the usual population bifurcation. One portion
of this bifurcated population will exchange routines with
any other ﬁrms ( a,  e,  c) ≈ (0,1,0) while another por-
tion of the population will be able to exchange routines
only within their own class ( a,  e,  c) ≈ (0,0,1).
VI. GENERALIZED INNOVATION SEQUENCES
The preceding examples establish that plausible pre-
dictions of evolutionary economic sequences can be made
by exploiting the order and information present within
the distributions describing an economic arena. This
methodology can be extended.
Consider the innovation environment in interacting
ﬁrms whose ﬁtness depends contingently on the perfor-
mance of other ﬁrms. For example, mining ﬁrms do well
when car companies are booming, or one electronics ﬁrm
suﬀers when another ﬁrm’s system becomes an industry
standard.
Consider two diﬀerent populations A and B obtaining
beneﬁt from each other and where, at any time, each pop-
ulation can be partitioned into distinct classes. Write the
population ﬁtness distribution for ﬁrm i of population A
currently occupying the nth class and ﬁrm j of popula-
tion B currently occupying the mth class as Ai(f,n)a n d
Bj(f,m) respectively.
Suppose the population interaction is such that the
ﬁtness of ﬁrms in each population depends on the current
population classes such that
Ai(f,n)=δnm ˜ Ai1(f)+( 1− δnm) ˜ Ai2(f)
Bj(f,m)=δnm ˜ Bj1(f)+( 1− δnm) ˜ Bj2(f). (29)
In the case where n = m, δnm = 1 and populations A
and B have ﬁtness distributions ˜ Ai1(f)a n d ˜ Bj1(f)r e -
spectively, while if n  = m, δnm = 0 giving these popula-
tions ﬁtness distributions ˜ Ai2(f)a n d ˜ Bj2(f) respectively.
These ﬁtness distributions have been written to explicitly
show the partitioning eﬀect of class information.
A cooperative symbiosis between the two populations
can be modeled by ensuring that populations occupying
complementary classes n = m have high average ﬁtness
so ˜ Ai1(f)a n d ˜ Bj1(f) are heavily weighted to positive
ﬁtness values. Conversely, populations having diﬀerent
class n  = m suﬀer low ﬁtness implying ˜ Ai2(f)a n d ˜ Bj2(f)
are weighted to negative ﬁtness values.
Competitive Red Queen type arms races between the
populations are modeled by simply adjusting the con-
stituent probability distributions. Then, if A popula-
tion ﬁrms occupy the same class as population B ﬁrms,
then population A ﬁrms have high ﬁtness and popula-
tion B ﬁrms have low ﬁtness. Thus, when n = m,
˜ Ai1(f) is weighted to positive ﬁtness levels while ˜ Bj1(f)
is weighted to negative ﬁtness levels. When the ﬁrms oc-
cupy diﬀerent classes n  = m, population A ﬁrms have low
ﬁtness with ˜ Ai2(f) being weighted to negative ﬁtness lev-
els while population B ﬁrms have high ﬁtness levels with
˜ Bj2(f) being weighted to positive ﬁtness levels.
Given these class diﬀerentiated ﬁtness distributions,
there exists potential beneﬁts for any ﬁrms with low ﬁt-
ness to innovate new strategies to eﬀect a class change
to realize potential beneﬁts and to maximize ﬁtness. As
usual, the existence of potential beneﬁts tilts innovation
towards class targeting or class changing strategies.
In symbiosis, strong selection pressures ensure that
both populations occupy the same class, and innovations
allowing either population to enter a new class creates
strong potential beneﬁts for further innovations of ei-
ther population to make the classes congruent. For Red
Queen arms races, strong potential ﬁtness beneﬁts drive
population B to innovate into any new class away from
population A and for population A to innovate to track
population B into this new class.
More general innovation models can be formulated. In
some of the above examples, ﬁrms have processed mar-
ket information for beneﬁt. In turn, this practice makes
it beneﬁcial for ﬁrms to distort market information for
their own ends, leading to distortions such as falsiﬁed
annual reports and accounts, advertising and marketing,
and so on. Subsequently, the existence of false informa-
tion makes it beneﬁcial for ﬁrms to innovate methods to
assess the value of information. This potentiates innova-
tions such as independent assessors, credit-raters and so
on.12
Interesting games result when payoﬀs are inherently
risky with irreducible uncertainties and variances. If vari-
ances or risk cannot be reduced by processing information
then this potentiates a market in the exchange of risk it-
self. A player can sell their risk in conducting some activ-
ity to another for a known return, while the buyer gains
access to guaranteed supplies, or potentially large proﬁts
or to minimized risk due to hedged uncertainties. This
market in risk itself leads to the innovation of futures
markets.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper generalizes game theory to develop a multi-
game environment featuring uncertainty which is de-
scribed by probability distributions. Game players pro-
cess information to reduce uncertainty and to maximize
beneﬁt. Evolution of the environment occurs over time
as players trade, manipulate and generate new resource
distributions. Innovation occurs as game players seek to
maximize beneﬁt by changing games, accessing novel re-
sources and trading information and novel goods. The
focus on ﬁrm organization and the processing of infor-
mation allows the prediction of plausible innovation se-
quences. This paper predicts the ordered appearance of
markets in the stages of single routine exchange, to rou-
tine packet exchange, to selected packet exchange, and
so on. These predictions were made on the basis of an-
alytic work. A simple simulation was presented showing
the expected punctuated equilibria dynamics.
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